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Uber’s Dilemma: How the ADA May End
the On-Demand Economy
Bryan Casey
12 U. MASS. L. REV. 124

ABSTRACT
This article is the first to point out that a few relatively low-profile lawsuits
involving Uber’s liability under the ADA could have an outcome-determinative
effect on O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the blockbuster employment
misclassification case brought against the startup by its own drivers. Because both
types of lawsuits hinge on the role that drivers play within Uber’s business model, a
ruling in favor of ADA liability which compelled Uber to exert additional control
over its drivers would also, in turn, jeopardize the drivers’ legal status as independent
contractors. Such an outcome would be catastrophic to Uber’s core business model,
costing the company hundreds of millions—if not billions—of dollars. And because
Uber is but one of hundreds of Silicon Valley startups to have adopted a similar
business model, a misclassification ruling against the tech giant could set in motion a
domino effect that impacts scores of companies throughout the “on-demand”
economy. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars may hang in the balance of
a few ADA cases. So, too, may the rights of some 57 million Americans with
disabilities, for whom victory could come to represent a major civil rights milestone.
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I. INTRODUCTION

R

aindrops patter against the windowpane of Kristin Parisi’s Boston
office as the clouds of an April storm break open above.1 Parisi is
hardly conscious of it nowadays, but she tends to be acutely aware of
the weather. To her, the sight of droplets trickling down a windowpane
represents something far different than it might to the rest of us. Ever
since a childhood car accident left her paralyzed from the waist down,
rain has come to signify an obstacle that can prove as formidable to
her as a flight of stairs lacking a handicap accessible alternative.
Relying on a wheelchair to get around means that, without the right
combination of planning and anticipation, a sudden storm could leave
her completely exposed to the elements—a state of affairs that adds
fresh new ironies to the phrase: “Staying a step ahead of the weather.”
After all, unlike most of her fellow Bostonians, Parisi cannot simply
dart into a subway terminal to wait out a downpour until a cab arrives.
After more than twenty-five years in a wheelchair, Parisi’s
heightened concern for the weather has become almost second-nature
to her. “It’s one of those things I forget—that I’m disabled—until
someone tells me I am,” she often says.2 Yet on this April day in 2015,
it is not the rain, but something else entirely, that reminds Parisi of her
disability.
Only minutes before departing her office, Parisi had arranged for a
ride home using a software application developed by a multibilliondollar Silicon Valley startup named Uber. The thirty-year-old public
relations executive had used her smartphone to request a ride and been
paired—through the application—with a nearby vehicle-for-hire
affiliated with the company. As the Uber driver pulled up to Parisi in a
“good-sized Mercedes sedan,” however, something unexpected
happened.3
1

2
3

This anecdote is adapted using quotations from two interviews of Kirstin Parisi
featured on The Daily Beast and CNET. See Dara Kerr, What Is Uber Doing To
Train Its Drivers On Disability Rights?, CNET (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.cnet.com/news/what-is-uber-doing-to-train-drivers-on-disabilityrights/ [https://perma.cc/YVW2-NJZQ]; Nina Strochlic, Uber: Disability Laws
Don’t Apply to Us, THE DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2015),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/21/uber-disability-laws-don-tapply-to-us.html [https://perma.cc/4F9Q-RL94].
Strochlic, supra note 1.
Kerr, supra note 1.
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“No, no, no,” the driver said as he gestured dismissively toward
her wheelchair. “That’s never going to fit in my car.”4
“It will,” replied Parisi, before patiently explaining that her
wheelchair—which weighs a grand total of 15 pounds and can be
folded to a fraction of its normal size—can easily fit into the trunk of
her own compact car.
Parisi continued to press, but the driver remained adamant. Their
back-and-forth went on at length until, finally, Parisi felt no other
choice than to concede defeat.
The rain fell unabated. Parisi watched from the curb as the Uber
driver’s spacious Mercedes sped off and melded into the Boston
traffic. On this occasion, as luck would have it, she managed to get a
ride home from a generous passerby, who spotted the rain-soaked
executive and offered to help.
Although the Uber driver’s refusal infuriated Parisi, she did not
plan to report the incident. Like many others faced with the quotidian
acts of discrimination that constitute just another day in the life of a
person with a disability, Parisi thought it best to just let it go. That is,
until shortly thereafter, when what she had dismissed as a single stroke
of bad luck happened again.
“The first incident was, I thought, a fluke,” she later recalled.5 But
two weeks later, after requesting an Uber vehicle to get her to the
airport, the driver again tried to deny her a ride—complaining that the
wheelchair would “dirty the car.”6
This time, however, Parisi refused to take no for an answer.
Against the driver’s protests, she dragged herself—and her
wheelchair—into the back of the vehicle without any assistance.
Securing her place in the back seat, though, did not spell the end of
Parisi’s troubles. The driver proceeded to berate her for the entire trip
to the airport, proclaiming that “just like [she] wouldn’t drive a dog,
she shouldn’t be expected to take a wheelchair.”7 According to Parisi,
the Uber driver also called her an “invalid.”8

4
5
6
7
8

Strochlic, supra note 1.
Id.
Kerr, supra note 1.
Id.
Strochlic, supra note 1.
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Upon arriving at the airport, the driver had the nerve to ask
whether Parisi would give her a bad review through the rating system
built into Uber’s software application.
“It has nothing to do with a bad review,” Parisi responded.9 “[I]t
has to do with illegal practice. You have to understand what you’re
doing is not only mean—it’s against the law.”10
These two incidents in quick succession spurred Parisi to lodge a
complaint with Uber. “This was the worst transportation experience of
my life,” she wrote in a report to the company. 11 She added, “I’m
humiliated”—quite a statement considering the thick skin one tends to
develop after living with a disability for almost twenty-five years.12
Uber responded by offering Parisi a refund for her ride, as well as a
$100 company gift card.13 But she does not intend to use the card until
Uber makes changes that would prevent the same kinds of refusals
from occurring in the future.14
Parisi said that after receiving the gift card, she again contacted
Uber, stating: “You need to do something about this and do it publicly.
Say, ‘We see this as a problem and we’re not going to fight the public
on this and do the right thing.’”15 But according to Parisi, what Uber
instead said was that, “[because it’s] a technology platform, not a
public service[. . .] the ADA16 does not apply to [Uber].”17
If Parisi’s description of Uber’s response has a familiar ring to it,
there is good reason why. Her exchange with Uber is not the first time
the multibillion-dollar company has invoked the defense that it is
merely a “technology platform” after being accused of violating the
law.18 In fact, the response is strikingly similar to the legal defense
Uber recently adopted in answer to the headline-grabbing class action
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Parisi’s use of the acronym ADA refers to a federal anti-discrimination statute
known as the Americans with Disabilities Act, discussed in detail below. See
Part IV infra.
Kerr, supra note 1.
See infra Part IV.
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lawsuit brought by its own drivers, who allege Uber has misclassified
them as independent contractors instead of as employees.19 The case,
O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., has received widespread media
attention thanks, in part, to the possibility that a ruling in favor of the
drivers could spell hundreds of millions of dollars in additional costs
for a company that many consider to be “the most successful Silicon
Valley startup ever.”20 Some commentators have even likened it to an
employment misclassification suit brought against FedEx by its own
drivers, which eventually settled for $228 million.21
Far less attention, however, has been paid to a seemingly unrelated
set of lawsuits also featuring Uber’s use of the “technology platform”
defense.22 Across the country—in states such as California, Arizona,
and Texas—dozens of individuals with wheelchairs or guide dogs
have filed suit against Uber, alleging that the company discriminated
against them based on their disability.23 Many of the documented
incidents bear a disconcerting resemblance to those reported by Parisi.
Customers with disabilities have allegedly been cursed at and yelled at
by Uber drivers.24 Others have allegedly been abandoned in extreme
weather.25 One passenger has even accused an Uber driver of stuffing
her guide dog in the trunk of a vehicle without her consent.26
19
20

21

22

23

24

25
26

O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Henry Ross, Ridesharing’s House of Cards: O’Connor V. Uber Tech., Inc. and
the Viability of Uber’s Labor Model in Washington, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1431,
1431 (2015); see also Carmel DeAmicis, Uber Could Have to Pay an Additional
$209 Million to Reclassify Its Drivers in California, RE/CODE (July 14, 2015),
http://recode.net /2015/07/14/uber-could-have-to-pay-an-additional-209-millionto-reclassify-its-drivers-in-california/ [https://perma.cc/7ALT-7RYJ].
DeAmicis, supra note 20; see also Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.,
Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
Martin De Caro, Uber Does Not Serve Disabled People, Say D.C. Advocates,
WAMU
88.5
(Aug.
17,
2015),
http://wamu.org/news/15/08/17/uber_does_not_serve_disabled
_people_say_dc_advocates [https://perma.cc/59Q2-TUJN].
Strochlic, supra note 1; see also Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015); McPhail v. Lyft, Inc., No. A-14CA-829-LY, 2015 WL 1143098 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2015); Ramos v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. SA-14-CA-502-XR, 2015 WL 758087 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20,
2015).
See Complaint, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 3:14CV-4086, 2014 WL 4628579 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 9, 2014).
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 46.
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With hundred-million-dollar figures looming in the background of
Uber’s employment misclassification case, a few suits featuring
customers with wheelchairs or guide dogs may seem to be the least of
the company’s worries. But a closer examination of the overlapping
issues involved in both types of lawsuits reveals that—though their
subject matter is seemingly unconnected—their outcomes may in fact
be inextricably linked. Indeed, Uber’s lackluster response to its
drivers’ alleged misconduct might simply be a symptom of a far more
systemic problem ailing the famous startup. It may not be that Uber
lacks the will to do what Parisi describes as “the right thing” for its
customers with disabilities.27 Rather, it may be that doing the right
thing, as Parisi and others envision it would imperil the company’s
entire way of doing business.
Uber’s business model currently hinges on classifying its more
than 160,000 U.S. drivers as independent contractors instead of as
employees.28 This distinction saves Uber from paying hundreds of
millions of dollars in benefits to which its drivers would otherwise be
entitled as W-2 employees under state and federal law.29 These savings
translate into a significant competitive advantage that has propelled
Uber’s meteoric rise from shoestring startup to multibillion-dollar
transportation titan in the span of just a few short years.30
But because the pioneering company’s business model is unlike
any that have come before it, Uber is essentially operating in a legal
grey area with respect to its workers’ employment status. The validity
of its independent contractor classification has never actually been
affirmed by a court—in fact, the opposite has occurred. Just last year,
a federal court expressed deep skepticism toward Uber’s classification
27
28

29

30

Kerr, supra note 1.
Emily Badger, Now We Know How Many Drivers Uber Has — And Have A
Better Idea Of What They’re Making, THE WASH. POST ONLINE (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/22/now-we-knowmany-drivers-uber-has-and-how-much-money-theyre-making%E2%80%8B/
[https://perma.cc/7ALT-7RYJ].
DeAmicis, supra note 20; see also Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067,
1074 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Employees are generally entitled to, among other
things, minimum wage and overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement
for work-related expenses, workers’ compensation, and employer contributions
to unemployment insurance.”).
Lucas E. Buckley et al., The Intersection of Innovation and the Law How
Crowdfunding and the on-Demand Economy Are Changing the Legal Field,
WYO. LAW., 36, 38 (Aug. 2015).
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of its drivers in a pretrial ruling issued in O’Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc.31 According to the court, the question of whether
Uber’s drivers should be classified as independent contractors, as
opposed to employees, was simply too close to call at the pretrial
stage.32
In California, where O’Connor is being litigated, the “principal test
of an employment relationship is whether the [employer] has the right
to control the manner and means” by which a worker accomplishes the
employer’s desired result.33 The test is highly complex and involves a
multifactor analysis, but essentially it boils down to this maxim: The
more control an employer exerts over its workers’ conduct, the more
likely they are to be classified as employees.34
Viewed through this lens, the true impetus behind Uber’s
invocation of the “technology platform” defense in response to
accusations of discrimination against its drivers is made readily
apparent. With hundreds of millions of dollars turning on California’s
“control” test of an employment relationship, someone such as Kristin
Parisi may say, “[D]o the right thing,” but all Uber can hear is the
word “control.”35 From Uber’s standpoint, steadfastly insisting that it
is merely a “technology platform” which bears no responsibility for
controlling its drivers’ conduct is its best means of guarding against an
employment misclassification ruling that could dismantle its entire
business model.36 For all the startup knows, any changes to its policies
and procedures—even something as minor as mandatory disability
training for its drivers—may be the decisive factor that tips the scales
in the direction of a potentially devastating ruling.
The result of this delicately-poised situation is a dilemma of
staggering economic and moral significance. On the one hand, Uber’s
unwillingness to take additional responsibility for controlling its
drivers’ conduct all but ensures that individuals with disabilities will
31
32
33

34
35
36

O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1133.
Id.
Alexander, 765 F.3d at 988 (citing S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus.
Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 350, (1989)).
Id.
Kerr, supra note 1.
Roger Chapin, Company Refuses to Follow Rules: Front Burner, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (July 3, 2014), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2014-0703/news/os-ed-front-burner-uber-con-20140702_1_uberx-taxi-regulationsorlando-interNat’l-airport [https://perma.cc/9YFD-3S5Q].
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continue to face discrimination.37 But on the other hand, earnestly
attempting to do what Parisi and others describe as “the right thing”
could profoundly impact Uber’s employment relationship with its
drivers—and, in so doing, jeopardize the very business model that has
enabled the startup’s unprecedented success.38
As if those stakes alone were not high enough, the choice Uber
ultimately makes in navigating this dilemma may not even be its own.
A ruling in favor of the plaintiffs who have sued Uber for
discriminating against customers with disabilities would force the
company to take legal responsibility for controlling its drivers’
misbehavior—an outcome that would fundamentally alter its existing
employment relationship.39 And because Uber is but one of several
hundred Silicon Valley startups now operating under a similar
business model, the ruling could set in motion a domino effect—first
toppling over Uber’s independent contractor classification, then
sending others throughout Silicon Valley tumbling.40 Indeed, the fate
of not just Uber, but also scores of companies whose cumulative
valuations number well into the billions of dollars, may rest on the
outcomes of a few unlikely lawsuits involving disability rights.41
Part II of this piece discusses the transformative effect that
software application-based companies, such as Uber, have had on the
modern transportation industry in the last decade. It argues that the
unprecedented success of Uber’s pioneering business model has led to
a similarly unprecedented crisis of identity for the startup. With
hundreds of millions of dollars hanging in the balance—and numerous
lawsuits filed throughout the country—the stage is set for a judicial
showdown of tremendous consequence.
Part III examines in detail some of the key legal ambiguities
surrounding Uber’s independent contractor classifications. It argues
that an employment misclassification ruling in O’Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. could be a defining moment in Silicon Valley that
stands to impact hundreds of other similarly-situated startups.

37
38
39

40
41

Kerr, supra note 1.
Id.
See Complaint, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 3:14CV-4086, 2014 WL 4628579 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 9, 2014).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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Part IV demonstrates that a few relatively low-profile
discrimination lawsuits against Uber have inadvertently created a
major dilemma for the startup. It argues that a ruling requiring Uber to
accommodate customers with disabilities could also tip its drivers’
delicately-balanced employment status in favor of a misclassification
decision—potentially setting off a chain reaction of misclassification
rulings throughout Silicon Valley.
This piece concludes by arguing that the dilemma facing Uber is a
matter of not just economic, but also moral, significance. Its resolution
will have lasting implications for the 57 million Americans with
disabilities who—more than twenty-five years after the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act—continue to experience troubling
disparities in access to transportation across the U.S. 42
II. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES
In the last decade, a number of companies have emerged that claim
to offer a sleeker “alternative to what they view as the inefficiencies of
traditional taxis services.”43 Their premise is simple: the companies
use smartphone-based software applications (“apps”) to connect
people seeking rides with private drivers offering vehicles-for-hire.44
In the span of just a few years, this new generation of startups has
“wedged [its] way into a once airtight taxi market,” historically
dominated by complex regulatory schemes and monopolistic behaviors
that gave rise to high transaction costs and service quality problems.45
Taking advantage of the natural efficiencies created by advances in
smartphone computing power and global positioning systems (“GPS”),
these companies have “brought new technology, new price structures,
and consistently reliable service” into a private transportation market
that had seen little in the way of innovation over the last halfcentury.46 These app-based transportation companies are often referred
42

43
44
45
46

Humphrey Taylor et al., The ADA, 20 Years Later, 115, KESSLER FOUND. AND
NAT’L ORG. ON DISABILITY (July 2010); see also Transportation Equity: Ensure
Access to All Modes of Transportation, UNITED SPINAL ASS’N.,
http://www.unitedspinal
.org/pdf/transportation_equity.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/24RX-7HSF].
Ross, supra note 20, at 1431.
Id.
Id. at 1434.
Id. at 1433.

134

UMass Law Review

v. 12 | 124

to as Transportation Networking Companies (“TNCs”), or more
colloquially, as “ridesharing” services—though the business model
resembles hailing a cab more than sharing a ride.47
Becoming a driver for one such company requires little more than
owning a vehicle and a smartphone with an internet connection.48
Drivers who wish to offer transportation-for-hire simply download the
app of their preferred TNC, submit their personal vehicle for
inspection, undertake an in-person interview, and undergo some form
of background check.49 The app provider hires qualifying applicants as
independent contractors with no fixed hours or minimum wage.50 Once
hired, drivers elect when, where, and for how long they wish to offer
their services on the app by indicating their availability to customers
through their smartphones.51 There is no minimum number of hours a
driver must work, nor a minimum number of required rides a driver
must provide.52 Only after 180 days of consecutive inactivity does a
driver’s eligibility to work for the app expire.53
Customers seeking a vehicle-for-hire can download the app,
register an account with the company, and submit a request for a
ride.54 After the request has been submitted, the app uses the GPS of
both parties’ smartphones to pair the customer with the nearest
47

48

49

50
51
52
53

54

Complaint, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 3:14-CV4086, 2014 WL 4628579 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 9, 2014).
Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 8687 (2015).
See Ramos v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SA-14-CA-502-XR, 2015 WL 758087, at
*11 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015) (“[A]nyone with a valid driver’s license, car
insurance, a clean record and a four-door vehicle can log onto the App and
connect with ride-seekers.”); see also Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 (“To be a
Lyft driver, a person must download the app, submit his car for inspection,
undergo some form of background check, and submit to an in-person interview
with a Lyft representative.”).
Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069-70.
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Drivers can reapply after their account expires for inactivity. Angela
Moscaritolo, California: Uber Driver an Employee, Not a Contractor, PC
MAGAZINE
ONLINE
(June
17,
2005),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2486228,00.asp
[https://perma.cc/F2VG-3ND7].
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 1760314, at *1
(N.D. Cal. May 2, 2014).
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available driver, and then plots the fastest route between pickup and
drop-off locations.55 Afterward, the app relays an estimate of the fare
to the customer, as well as a best approximation of the driver’s time of
arrival—which is updated in real-time on the customer’s phone as the
driver approaches.56 Once the customer arrives at the requested
destination, drivers do not accept cash payments. Rather, a fee based
on mileage, duration, and projected demand is automatically deducted
from the customer’s credit card, which the company stores on file.57
Drivers receive a share of the fee, typically in the region of eighty
percent.58 The company providing the app keeps the rest.
The contrast between ordering a ride through a TNC and hailing a
conventional cab goes a long way toward explaining the widespread
adoption that these companies have enjoyed over the course of just a
few short years. Although the initial process of registering with a TNC
can take several minutes and requires the conveyance of sensitive
credit card information, every subsequent request for a ride is highly
streamlined. Customers merely log onto the app, punch in their
intended destination, and submit a request for a ride. Having done so,
customers in most cities can expect to be picked up within a matter of
minutes, depending on the time of day and market demand.
TNCs market the experience as “transportation at the click of a
button,” and unlike many overblown business slogans, this one often
comes close to living up to its own rhetoric. By almost any measure,
app-based transportation services offer the ordinary consumer a
quicker, simpler, cheaper, and more reliable alternative to hailing a
55

56
57

58

How to Request a Ride?, UBER TECH., INC., https://help.uber.com/h/082ab6d7fc81-41f5-a17a-49e5e82bbebd [https://perma.cc/9YVF-RZLT].
Id.
How Does Uber Work?, UBER TECH., INC., https://help.uber.com/h/738d1ff75fe0-4383-b34c-4a2480efd71e [https://perma.cc/5UEU-GXY3]; see also Cotter,
60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069-70. Some previous iterations of the model operated on a
more discretionary “donation” system that more resembled traditional taxi
payments. For simplicity, this essay does not dwell on the distinction.
O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142. This percentage has changed significantly in
recent months, with the addition of new pricing structures, such as “surge
pricing.” New drivers now typically receive less than 80% of the fare total.
Older drivers remain grandfathered in to 80% rate. See Sage Lazzaro, Uber
Drivers Plan Boycott After Fare Cuts Slash Their Earnings to Below Minimum
Wage, THE OBSERVER ONLINE (Jan. 1 2016), http://observer.com/2016/01/uberdrivers-plan-boycott-after-fare-cuts-slash-their-earnings-to-below-minimumwage/ [https://perma.cc/V3VN-NXRE].
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conventional cab. With TNCs, customers can tell whether a ride is
available—and at what cost—with little more than a glance downward
at their phone. There is no placing of calls to multiple dispatchers with
hopes of tracking down an available cabby, no flailing of one’s arms
on a street corner trying to catch a driver’s attention, no wondering
whether an approaching cab might arbitrarily pass by, and no
wandering onto the street uncertain of whether a taxi will even be in
the area. Better still, there is no need to carry any cash, no need to
calculate a tip, and no need to even reach for a wallet or purse. And if
those differences were not enough to sway some consumers, TNCs
also provide a rating system that allows customers to evaluate drivers
based on the quality of their service, which companies can use to
screen workers and monitor them for optimal performance.59
A. Transportation Network Companies’ Disruptive Effect on
the Private Transportation Industry
With great innovation, of course, comes great market disruption.
Less than a decade since their inception, TNCs have come to represent
an existential threat to conventional cab companies the world over.60 A
new generation of tech-savvy consumers has flocked to the ease and
inexpense of this new breed of transportation provider, leaving bricksand-mortar taxi services largely in the lurch. Public opinion surveys
offer a glimpse into some of the consumer forces driving this rapid
shift. In a study commissioned by the City of Seattle in September
2013—at a time when TNCs “were growing in the area”—more than
ninety percent of TNC customers rated the response time for TNC
vehicle-for-hire requests as “Good” or “Very Good.”61 By contrast,
59
60
61

Ross, supra note 20, at 1440.
See infra Part IV.
Id. But see Lisa Rayle et al., App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services: Comparing
Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips and User Characteristics in San Francisco, U.C.
TRANSP.
CTR.
(Nov.
2014)
http://www.its.dot.gov/itspac/Dec2014/RidesourcingWhitePaper_Nov2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KVQ4-3RYK] (“Bias and inaccuracy in respondent perception
or recollection of wait time might partially account for the difference between
modes. For instance, ridesourcing apps provide the user with an estimated wait
time, but the actual wait time may be longer—without the user noticing or
recalling the longer wait. In contrast, respondents may overestimate taxi wait
times. For example, they may recall one negative experience more than several
positive ones. Even so, ridesourcing’s short wait times and consistency across
time and location—or at least perceptions of quick, consistent response—
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just fifty percent of traditional taxi customers rated their vehicle’s
response time as “Good” or “Very Good.”62 The study also found that
“[o]f 105 negative comments” received during the survey, “102 were
related to taxis.”63 Further, “[o]f 16 positive comments, only 1 was
related to taxis.”64 TNCs also received categorically higher customer
ratings on six specific consumer metrics polled—”(1) willingness to
accept credit cards, (2) courtesy of driver, (3) route knowledge of
driver, (4) appearance of vehicle, (5) promptness of arrival, and (6)
ease of booking/hailing a ride.”65
Companies pioneering the app-based business model—with catchy
names such as Lyft, Sidecar, and Bridj—have transformed, seemingly
overnight, from unknown startups to household names, but none more
so than Uber. Within a five-and-a-half-year period, the TNC went
from a startup consisting of four people and two drivers to a global
empire spanning six continents and operating in some 300 cities with
over one million drivers.66 Uber’s latest valuation, triggered by a
December 2015 venture capital investment round, put the company’s
worth at $68 billion, on par with General Motors and Ford Motor
Company.67 Uber’s meteoric rise “has led many to anoint [it] as the
most successful Silicon Valley startup ever.”68 Like Google and a
select few other tech behemoths, Uber has secured its place in the
English lexicon as a verb unto itself, roughly synonymous with “to

62
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64
65
66
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represent an important difference between ridesourcing and traditional taxis
services from the user’s perspective.”).
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taxi.”69 And in the business world, “Uber may be becoming a verb
meaning to ‘radically disrupt’ an entire industry.”70
B. Uber’s Identity Crisis
Although many view Uber as tantamount to a taxi company, the
transportation giant itself balks at the comparison. It insists it is not a
fleet operator, but a “technology platform” that maintains a hands-off
relationship with the drivers and passengers who use its app. Uber is
quick to point out that it “owns no vehicles, and contends that it
employs no drivers.”71 By its own semantic framework, Uber
functions as an “intermediary” that simply “generates leads for
[drivers] through its software.”72 Under Uber’s theory, it is the drivers
who “perform services. . . for their riders, while [Uber] is an
uninterested bystander of sorts, merely furnishing a platform that
allows drivers and riders to connect, analogous perhaps to a company
like eBay.”73
Uber’s business model—at least as it currently stands—hinges on
its self-identification as a “technology platform.” For good reason, too.
The structure allows the company to compensate drivers as
independent contractors, not employees, while simultaneously
allowing it to disclaim liability for a range of other state and federal
laws that apply to traditional transportation services.74 After all,
employees and regulations are expensive. Among other costs, Uber’s
legal assumption that it is a technology platform enables it to avoid
remedial labor statutes that impose obligations such as minimum wage
and overtime pay requirements, meal and rest breaks for drivers,
reimbursement for work-related expenses, workers’ compensation,
employer contributions to unemployment insurance, Medicare and
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Social Security withholdings, and employee benefits.75 And what is
more, although Uber sets internal guidelines urging its drivers to
follow state and federal laws mandating anti-discriminatory and safety
standards, it ultimately disclaims any “responsibility or liability for
any transportation services provided to [riders] by such third
parties”—a luxury not afforded to traditional taxi companies.76
For a company of Uber’s size, the savings that result from this
state of what some call “regulatory arbitrage” are staggering—by some
estimates, in the hundreds of millions of dollars.77 While it is by no
means the only reason behind Uber’s explosive growth in recent years,
it is an important factor contributing to its ability to outcompete its
more conventional rivals.78 The “technology platform” model—for
better or for worse—simply eliminates many costs that bricks-andmortar transportation companies face by virtue of their less ethereal
status.79
One tiny detail, however, stands in the way of Uber’s self-styled
assertion that it is a technology platform: it has not been tested in
court80 until recently.81 Across the United States, an industry-defining
battle has begun over the legality of Uber’s independent contractorbased business model.82 As one commentator notes, while “attacking
highly-regulated markets, acting without permission, and [upending
longstanding trade practices] may be helpful strategies for creating a
75
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Golden: “Uber’s arguments against [following the ADA] are the efforts of a
private company to evade regulation, regulation which is there for the public
good, regulation that other companies offering similar services for many years
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Rayle et al., supra note 61.
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2015),
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competitive edge and revolutionizing an industry . . . [those] same
factors are—not surprisingly—magnets for litigation.”83
Leading the charge in this battle are a number of highly publicized
lawsuits that have put Uber’s legal status as both an employer and a
transportation provider at center stage.84 The cases have become part
of a broader national debate—spanning news outlets, social media, and
academic circles—that cuts to the core of the multibillion-dollar
startup’s very identity.85 In one camp are those who hold that Uber is
simply a newer, sleeker version of an age-old paradigm: a taxi
service.86 They contend that a legal and regulatory framework which
borrows from the traditional cab industry is needed in order to
counteract the negative externalities created by the TNC business
model.87 In the other camp are those who hold that Uber and its rivals
are ushering in a new era of private transportation—and the rules that
have historically governed the industry do not, and should not, apply
to these pioneering enterprises.88
III. UBER, EMPLOYMENT MISCLASSIFICATION, AND THE ONDEMAND ECONOMY
The loudest shot yet fired in the battle over Uber’s legal identity
sounded on January 27, 2016. Lyft, a TNC and smaller rival to Uber,
agreed to pay $12.25 million to settle an employment misclassification
suit brought against it in 2013.89 Though the Lyft settlement did not
attract the level of media attention usually garnered by its much larger
competitor, the eyes of Silicon Valley’s business leaders were
watching closely.
83
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The reason for this watchfulness is that Lyft and its $60 billion
competitor, Uber, share a business model based on the classification of
their drivers as “1099” independent contractors, a namesake owing to
the 1099 Internal Revenue Service form associated with the status.90
The structural similarities between the two companies means that
although they are fierce competitors in the business world, in the legal
world they oftentimes find themselves as unlikely allies.91 As the
contours of the new legal landscape created by the emergence of TNCs
continue to be defined by litigation, any outcome that impacts one
TNC is likely to have significant implications for the others.
The lead-up to the multimillion-dollar Lyft settlement began with a
lawsuit, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., brought by the TNC’s own drivers, who
contended that under California’s legal test for distinguishing the
employment status of workers, their relationship with Lyft better
approximated that of full-fledged employees than that of independent
contractors.92 In a pretrial denial of Lyft’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, a California district court expressed sympathy for the
drivers’ misclassification argument, observing that “Lyft drivers don’t
seem much like independent contractors.”93 The Court continued, “We
generally understand an independent contractor to be someone with a
special skill (and with the bargaining power to negotiate a rate for the
use of that skill), who serves multiple clients, performing discrete tasks
for limited periods, while exercising great discretion over the way the
work is actually done.”94 According to the court, independent
contractors constituted the types of workers who might be “found in
the Yellow Pages to perform a task that the principal or the principal’s
own employees were unable to perform—often something tangential
to the day-to-day operations of the principal’s business.”95 Lyft
drivers, by contrast, played a “central, not tangential [role in] Lyft’s
business.”96 Further, they performed “no special skill when [giving]
90
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rides.”97 The Court also noted that while “Lyft might not control when
the drivers work,” it had “a great deal of power over how they actually
do their work, including the power to fire them [when] they don’t meet
Lyft’s specifications about how to give rides.” 98 Moreover, the Court
observed, “some Lyft drivers no doubt treat their work as a full-time
job . . . even while they lack any power to negotiate their rate of pay.
Indeed, this type of Lyft driver—the driver who gives ‘Lyfts’ 50 hours
a week and relies on the income to feed his family—looks very much
like the kind of worker the California Legislature has always intended
to protect as an ‘employee.’”99
Despite acknowledging the obvious merit to the drivers’ argument,
the Court was also careful to emphasize that “Lyft drivers don’t seem
like employees [either].”100 It observed that employees are generally
understood “to be someone who works under the direction of a
supervisor, for an extended or indefinite period of time, with fairly
regular hours, receiving most or all his [or her] income from that one
employer (or perhaps two employers).”101 Lyft drivers, conversely,
could “work as little or as much as they want, and c[ould] schedule
their driving around their other activities.”102 Indeed, driving for Lyft,
the Court remarked, could be done “as a side activity” for some
workers, “to be fit into his [or her] schedule when time permits and
when he [or she] needs a little extra income.”103
Eventually, after weighing both parties’ arguments at length, the
court all but threw up its hands, stating, “As should now be clear, the
jury in this case will be handed a square peg and asked to choose
between two round holes.”104 Exasperated by what it described as a
“20th Century [test] for classifying workers [that] isn’t very helpful in
addressing this 21st Century problem,” the Court concluded: “Some
factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and some are
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ambiguous. . . [a]nd because the test provides nothing remotely close
to a clear answer, it will . . . be for [the jury] to decide.”105
Upon hearing the court’s vacillating analysis, both Lyft and its
drivers elected to settle rather than put the matter before a jury.
Apparently, the prospect of what the court described as a virtual roll of
the dice was considered unacceptably risky by both parties to the
dispute.
Had the drivers prevailed in court, Lyft would have been required
to reclassify them as W-2 employees—an outcome that would have
entitled them to both retroactive compensation for their prior
misclassification and to the “many benefits and protections” afforded
under California and federal law going forward.106 Instead, the
settlement preserved their independent contractor classification, but
required that Lyft alter its terms of service.107 Among other changes,
Lyft will now need to provide a reason for terminating its drivers.108
Drivers will also be able to contest termination decisions through an
arbitration process available at the company’s expense.109
Though the settlement entails some costs for the company, a ruling
in favor of W-2 employee status, by all accounts, would have been
significantly more expensive for the TNC. Moreover, because the
dispute never reached trial, the true legal status of the TNC’s ondemand workers remains an open question.
A. O’CONNOR V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Uber, meanwhile, is continuing its own fight against an almost
identical suit brought in its hometown of San Francisco. But unlike
Lyft, the ride-hailing giant apparently has no intention of settling.110
The case is O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.111 It has been billed
105
106
107
108
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110
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as “[t]he lawsuit that could change Uber forever.”112 The outcome—as
was true of the Lyft suit before it settled—is far from certain.
What is certain, however, is that the stakes involved are massive.
In 2015, FedEx settled an employment misclassification suit with its
drivers for $228 million in what is widely seen as a close analog to the
dispute at issue in O’Connor.113 The settlement covered “2300 [sic]
individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in
California between 2000 and 2007.”114 As in O’Connor, the drivers
claimed their employer had misclassified them as 1099 independent
contractors while treating them as W-2 employees. They “filed class
action claims for a variety of alleged violations under federal and state
law, including claims for reimbursement of business expenses, unpaid
overtime, failure to provide meal and rest periods, reimbursement of
deductions in pay, and non-payment of termination pay.”115
The eventual settlement followed in the wake of a Ninth Circuit
ruling which declared, resoundingly, that FedEx’s drivers were
“employees as a matter of law.”116 Hearing those words uttered by
California’s highest appellate court, undoubtedly, boded ominously for
Uber. But even more concerning for the startup was the weight that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision placed on aspects of FedEx’s business model
that it shares in common with the TNC. Among other considerations,
the ruling turned on the fact that driving for FedEx was “essential to
FedEx’s core business,” did not require a high degree of skill,” was
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often defined by lengthy tenures with the company, “and involved
customers who were FedEx’s rather than the drivers’.”117
After reaching the settlement with FedEx, Beth Ross, the attorney
representing the class of drivers, victoriously proclaimed, “The $228
million settlement, one of the largest employment law settlements in
recent memory, sends a powerful message to employers in California
and elsewhere that the cost of independent contractor misclassification
can be financially punishing, if not catastrophic, to a business.”118
Whether Ross’s words will prove prophetic for TNCs has yet to be
seen. But the $228 million figure nonetheless looms large in the
background of Uber’s own employment classification worries. The
class of drivers represented in O’Connor could comprise as many as
160,000 workers—all claiming violations similar to those alleged by
the 2,300 who filed suit against FedEx.119 If Uber loses in court, the
damages owed to such a large number of misclassified workers could
be immense. Yet even that sum might pale in comparison to the costs
of Uber adopting an employee-based business model going forward.
Uber is not a publicly-traded company, so a lack of financial
transparency makes calculating the true costs of a court-mandated
reclassification of its workers speculative at best—but that has not
stopped some observers from trying. Uber has publicly announced that
it has roughly 45,000 active drivers in California, a number which is
rapidly growing.120 A recent commentator has estimated that
classifying those California drivers as employees could cost the
company as much as $209 million annually in the Golden State
alone.121
To put that figure into perspective, consider Uber’s current
revenue. In August of 2015, a leaked investor presentation revealed
that Uber’s drivers were projected to take in some $10.84 billion in
2015, up from $2.91 billion the year before.122 The TNC itself keeps
117
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twenty percent of the revenue from fares—meaning that its own
earnings were in the $2 billion region that year.123 Of course, until
Uber publicly releases its books, such calculations are simply educated
guesswork. But the numbers offer a useful point of comparison. They
reveal that the added cost of reclassifying Uber’s drivers as employees
could consume as much ten percent of the TNC’s current net
revenue.124 And that only accounts for Uber’s California drivers.
B. O’Connor’s Implications for the On-demand Economy
Eye-popping numbers like the $209 million figure have not
escaped the attention of the rest of Silicon Valley. 125 Not merely out of
concern for the TNC’s financial future, but also because Uber is
widely viewed as the progenitor of a whole family of copy-cat
companies whose business models also rely on workers nebulously
classified as independent contractors.126 Hundreds of Silicon Valley
startups borrowing Uber’s model now operate in what is widely
termed the “on-demand” economy—so-called because of its ability to
deliver everything from cleaning services, to accommodations, to food
deliveries at the click of a mouse or tap of a smartphone button.127
Multimillion-dollar startups such as DoorDash and GrubHub are
routinely described as the “Uber of food delivery”; Taskrabbit, the
“Uber of errands”; and Instacart, the “Uber of groceries.”128 The “Uber
of X” category goes on and on, and in theory is seemingly endless.
According to one recent study, the labor force created by these
companies “is expected to include an estimated 7.6 million [workers]
by 2020.”129
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When MyClean—a startup billed as the “Uber of
housecleaning”—altered its business model from independent
contractors to full-time employees in anticipation of misclassification
suits, the company saw its labor costs soar by some forty percent.130
MyClean’s switch, bear in mind, was done voluntarily.131 A court
ruling mandating such a shift stands poised to affect a category of
companies whose cumulative valuations, depending on which venture
capital firm one asks, number into the hundreds of billions of
dollars.132
Perhaps even more foreboding for on-demand companies is the
fact that O’Connor is not the first time Uber’s employment
classification has been litigated in California—and on the earlier
occasion, Uber ended up on the losing side.133 In June of 2015, the
California
Labor
Commission
resolved
an
employment
misclassification dispute brought by Barbara Ann Berwick, a former
Uber driver who sued the TNC in San Francisco Superior Court.134
Holding that Berwick was a company employee—not a contractor—
the commission awarded her more than $4,000 in reimbursable
business expenses and accumulated interest, stating, “Without drivers
such as [Berwick], [Uber’s] business would not exist.”135 The
Commission cited Uber’s exclusive control over the use of its app, the
“integral” role that drivers play in its business model, and its “nonnegotiable service fee” as the basis for the outcome.136 The decision,
however, is nonbinding and applies only to Berwick herself.137 Better
still from Uber’s perspective, the ruling could be overturned on
130
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appeal.138 The TNC can also take solace from the fact that the
California Labor Commission’s decision stands in opposition to
numerous occasions in other states where Uber has “prevailed . . . in
keeping its definition of drivers as independent contractors.”139
Despite Uber’s victories in other states, some on-demand
companies apparently regarded the Labor Commission’s decision as
the proverbial writing on the wall for their workers’ employment
status. Both Instacart (an on-demand grocery delivery service) and
Shyp (an on-demand shipping service) moved to preemptively
reclassify some of their contractors as employees in the weeks
following the California decision.140 Others, already anticipating such
an outcome, had reclassified their workers long ago, or purposely
counted their workers as employees from the outset.141 Such
companies “include cleaners MyClean and Managed by Q; laundry
service FlyCleaners; virtual assistants Zirtual; personal assistants
Alfred; and delivery service Parcel.”142
Many following the labor disputes believe that O’Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. is destined to provide the definitive word on the
legal status of workers hired by on-demand companies.143 But what
fewer realize is that a less conspicuous set of cases may prove to be
even more decisive. The suits involve dozens of plaintiffs with
disabilities who have accused Uber and Lyft of violating a federal antidiscrimination statute known as the Americans with Disabilities
Act.144 The plaintiffs allege that the TNCs have fallen short of their
statutory obligation to ensure that their drivers do not deny service to
customers on the basis of a disability.145 In response, Uber and Lyft
have asserted that, as mere technology platforms, they bear no ultimate
responsibility for their drivers’ conduct.146
Although the two types of cases initially appear to be unrelated,
their outcomes may, in fact, be inextricably linked. A court ruling
138
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requiring Uber and Lyft to take legal responsibility for their drivers’
misbehavior would fundamentally alter the employment relationship
that currently exists between TNCs and their drivers. Such a radical
shift could, in turn, have profound implications for their drivers’ legal
status as independent contractors. Indeed, it may be that O’Conner,
which currently holds Silicon Valley in rapt attention, is actually a
sideshow of sorts—and a few cases involving disability
discrimination, which have received a far smaller share of the
limelight, are the real blockbuster lawsuits that hold the fates of both
Uber and the on-demand economy within their grasp.
IV. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE “LAW OF
MATHEMATICS”
Jamey Gump is blind, uses a guide dog, and is a
member of [the National Federation of the Blind] of
California [(“NFBC”)]. On or about March 23, 2014,
an UberX[147] driver refused to transport Mr. Gump in
San Leandro, California from a work-related event to
his home. On that occasion, Mr. Gump used the Uber
mobile app to summon an UberX taxi. The UberX
driver pulled the vehicle up to where Mr. Gump was
standing on the curb and, after noticing that Mr. Gump
had a dog, said “no pets allowed.” Mr. Gump tried to
explain that his guide dog was a service animal and
that the UberX driver had a legal obligation to allow
the service animal into the vehicle. Mr. Gump
attempted to show the UberX driver an official guide
dog identification card issued by his guide dog’s
training program. The driver adamantly refused to let
Mr. Gump into the vehicle and drove away.
[O]n or about May 21, 2014, another UberX driver
refused to transport Mr. Gump because of his service
animal. . . . After the requested UberX vehicle had
pulled up to the curb, Mr. Gump and his friend opened
a passenger door. The UberX driver began shouting
147

UberX is Uber’s most widely used—and lowest cost—transportation option. It
allows a customer to request a sedan that can carry up to four passengers. See
UBER TECH., INC., https://www.uber.com/ride/uberx/ [https://perma.cc/8X76P8WJ].

150

UMass Law Review

v. 12 | 124

“no dogs!” Mr. Gump tried to explain that his dog was
a service animal for his disability and was legally
allowed in the vehicle. The UberX driver began
shouting and cursing at Mr. Gump and his friend in a
language that Mr. Gump did not understand. Mr.
Gump’s friend speaks the language and was offended
by the profanity and insults. As Mr. Gump attempted to
enter the vehicle, the UberX driver quickly accelerated
the vehicle forward, nearly injuring Mr. Gump’s guide
dog and causing an open passenger door to strike Mr.
Gump’s friend. The UberX driver then sped away and
cancelled the ride request. Mr. Gump and his friend
immediately called the police to file a report and used
alternative transportation to travel home approximately
forty-five minutes later.
[O]n August 20, 2014, Mr. Gump requested an UberX
ride to pick him up at 214 Van Ness Ave., San
Francisco, California. Mr. Gump determined from the
map in the Uber iPhone application that his requested
vehicle was about to turn onto his street. Mr. Gump
then went out to the curb with his guide dog in direct
sight of the oncoming vehicle to intercept the UberX
driver. Mr. Gump noticed a vehicle slow its speed to a
near stop in front of him and then accelerate again as it
passed him on the curb. A few seconds later, Mr. Gump
received a notification on his phone that the UberX
driver had cancelled the ride. Mr. Gump then requested
a second UberX ride, but Uber assigned the exact same
driver and vehicle to pick up Mr. Gump for a second
time. Again, a few seconds after Mr. Gump received
confirmation that this same driver was on the way, the
driver cancelled on him for a second time.
[M]r. Gump wants to use the UberX taxi service
because it is convenient and available near his home,
an area with limited public transportation. However, he
stopped using Uber after this most recent experience
because he concluded that it is not a reliable
transportation option for him. Notwithstanding Mr.
Gump’s repeated complaints to Uber about his negative
experiences over the last several months, his access to

2017

Uber's Dilemma

151

Uber’s services has not improved. Mr. Gump hopes that
Uber will change its policies and practices to better
prevent discrimination against passengers with service
animals so that he can enjoy Uber with the same
convenience and reliability enjoyed by others.148
The above excerpt detailing Jamey Gump’s experiences with Uber
comes from a complaint filed against the TNC by the National
Federation of the Blind of California in 2014, alleging that Uber
discriminated against customers based on their disabilities. The
complaint documents more than thirty instances “where drivers of
UberX vehicles refused to transport blind individuals with service
animals . . . after they initially agreed to transport the riders.”149 One
such plaintiff—a blind woman with a guide dog—accused Uber of
denying her service on no less than twelve separate occasions.150
Others alleged they were “abandoned . . . in extreme weather” because
of their guide dogs.151
Some plaintiffs who were not outright denied service by Uber
drivers joined the complaint after experiencing “harass[ment]” and
“serious[] mishandl[ing]” of their guide animals by Uber drivers.152
One driver allegedly forced a plaintiff’s guide dog into the trunk of a
sedan without her knowledge.153 When she realized “where the driver
had placed her dog, she pleaded with the driver to pull over so that she
could retrieve her dog from the trunk, but the driver refused her
request.”154
People with service animals are not the only individuals with
disabilities allegedly discriminated against by TNC drivers. In Texas,
several wheelchair-bound plaintiffs recently filed suit against both
Uber and Lyft, alleging that the TNCs “allow their vehicles-for-hire to
deny service to the disabled,” “do not provide vehicles-for-hire
services to mobility impaired consumers,” “provide [no] manner for
securing a wheelchair accessible vehicle,” and “provide no training or
148
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guidance to the vehicles-for-hire that use their service concerning
lawfully meeting the needs of disabled customers.”155 The plaintiffs
reported multiple occasions where Uber or Lyft failed to dispatch
wheelchair accessible vehicles or otherwise accommodate their
transportation requests.156
Another woman—a grass-roots disability rights activist—filed suit
against Lyft in Texas after one of its drivers allegedly left her on the
curb because of her wheelchair.157 In Arizona, too, a retired judge who
was a wheelchair user filed suit after an Uber driver allegedly denied
him service.158
Each of these lawsuits have claimed that the TNCs responsible for
employing the drivers violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), a federal anti-discrimination statute designed to protect the
civil rights of people with disabilities.159 Title III of the ADA
“prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the full and equal
enjoyment of public accommodations and . . . transportation
services.”160 Among other stipulations, entities that provide public
accommodations, public transportation, or are private companies
engaged primarily in providing transportation “may not impose
eligibility criteria that tend to screen out disabled individuals”; must
make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to provide disabled individuals
full and equal enjoyment”; and “must remove architectural and
structural barriers, or if barrier removal is not readily achievable, must
ensure equal access for the disabled through alternative methods.”161
155
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Taxi services, in particular, are forbidden from discriminating “against
individuals with disabilities by actions including, but not limited to,
refusing to provide service to individuals with disabilities who can use
taxi vehicles, refusing to assist with the stowing of mobility devices,
and charging higher fares or fees for carrying individuals with
disabilities and their equipment than are charged to other persons.”162
What may come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the litany of
misconduct alleged by the plaintiffs in the ADA suits is that both Uber
and Lyft have longstanding policies of non-discrimination that, at least
in theory, are ADA-compliant. According to Uber’s code of conduct,
“[i]t is unacceptable to refuse to provide . . . services based on a
person’s race, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation,
sex, marital status, gender identity, age or any other characteristic
protected under applicable federal or state law.”163 Likewise, “[i]t is
Lyft’s policy that passengers that use wheelchairs that can safely and
securely fit in the trunk of the vehicle or backseat [sic] of the car
without obstructing the view of the driver should be reasonably
accommodated by drivers on the Lyft platform, and drivers should
make every reasonable effort to transport the passenger and his or her
wheelchair.”164 Lyft’s policies also provide for the accommodation of
service animals, but the TNC “recommends that passengers who need
them call the driver in advance and let them know.”165

162
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164
165

and auxiliary aids need not be provided, if doing so would ‘fundamentally alter’
the services or accommodations being offered. Auxiliary aids are also
unnecessary when they would ‘result in an undue burden.’ As we have noted,
moreover, the barrier-removal and alternative access requirements do not apply
when these requirements are not ‘readily achievable.’ Additionally, Title III
does not impose nondiscrimination or accommodation requirements if, as a
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Uber was careful to emphasize its code of conduct in response to
some of the negative publicity generated in the wake of the lawsuit
filed by the NFBC. Spokeswoman Kristin Carvell issued the
statement, “It is Uber’s policy that driver partners are expected to
comply with local, state and federal laws regarding the transportation
of service animals, and we have consistently communicated this policy
to drivers nationwide.”166 The company went on to “den[y] any
responsibility by saying it doesn’t discriminate against the disabled
and that it can transport blind and wheelchair-bound passengers.”167
Later that same year, however, David Plouffe—who joined Uber in
2014 after serving as both White House adviser and campaign
manager to President Barack Obama—admitted to a slightly more
nuanced view of the issue: “We’ve got a lot of drivers, so
unfortunately the law of mathematics is that occasionally we may have
somebody who doesn’t understand for whatever reason. Sometimes
we’ve seen instances where people say, ‘well I’ve got leather seats and
I don’t want a dog on them.’ That’s just not okay.”168
Uber and Lyft reserve the right to discipline or “deactivate” (i.e.
fire) drivers who breach their anti-discrimination policies.169But,
crucially, both TNCs ultimately disclaim legal liability for riders
harmed by their drivers’ conduct—each insisting it “only controls its
smartphone App, and has no ability to require App users to modify
their personal vehicles or control the conditions under which they
operate.”170 The result of this hands-off approach, says the U.S.
Department of Justice, who joined NFBC in its suit, is that “Uber
allegedly fails to respond, does not take steps to address the
discrimination, and frequently denies responsibility for the
discrimination” by its drivers.171
166
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Meanwhile, riders with disabilities who request a ride through a
TNC are left with few other options than to cross their fingers and
wonder: Will I be lucky enough to get a driver who chooses to follow
the code of conduct? Or will I be paired with one who turns me away?
This state of uncertainty, according to the long list of plaintiffs who
have filed suit under the ADA, means that individuals with disabilities
“have been and continue to be denied access to [Uber’s] services on
multiple occasions when they attempt to use Uber’s . . . transportation
service.” 172 Moreover, the number of people affected extends far
beyond those directly denied service. It includes people with
disabilities who merely catch wind of the incidents and opt not to use
the service for fear of unexpected delays, unfair cancellation fees, or
humiliation at the hands of a driver.173
A. The Dilemma of ADA Compliance
The challenge Uber faces in responding to the array of ADA
lawsuits brought against it is that handing down a true mandate of
compliance would require the company to exert more control over its
drivers than merely drafting anti-discriminatory guidelines. And when
a company is potentially facing hundreds of millions of dollars in costs
over the classification of its California workers, that word “control”
can be cause for serious consternation. In California, “[t]he principal
test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom
service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of
accomplishing the result desired.”174 The test is highly complex and
involves a multifactor analysis (discussed briefly in Part III), but as a
general rule, it can be understood as follows: The more control an
employer exerts over its workers, the more likely those workers are to
be classified as employees.
Seen through this lens, the ADA suits against both Uber and Lyft
are, ultimately, cases about control. The plaintiffs insist that TNCs
must do more to prevent discrimination than “consistently
communicat[e]” anti-discriminatory policies to drivers.175 They claim
the best way to accomplish such a goal is to hold TNCs legally liable
for controlling their drivers’ conduct. Uber and Lyft, meanwhile, are
172
173
174
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unsurprisingly resistant. They are well aware that if traditional cab
companies offer any indication, the amount of additional control over
their drivers that a finding of ADA liability would entail might be
substantial.
The taxi company Limo Economy Cab of Eau Claire, Wisconsin
offers an illustrative example. After being investigated by the
Department of Justice based on allegations that “one of its drivers
refused to help a customer place his wheelchair in the trunk,” the cab
company instituted changes that have become standard industry
practices.176 In addition to mandating that its drivers undergo ADA
compliance training, it also required them “to assist with the stowing
of mobility devices, to transport service animals in the company of
individuals with disabilities, to charge the same fares and fees to
individuals with disabilities accompanied by service animals or
equipment as is charged to others, to post disability rights and
complaint notices in taxis, and to maintain a log of all such complaints
and resolutions.” 177 Other cab companies have gone even further.
Many Chicago taxi companies, for example, require that, in addition to
general ADA compliance training, their drivers must specifically “take
classes to learn about service dogs.”178 Beyond training, other cab
companies also operate under a mandate of maintaining a certain
percentage of wheelchair accessible vehicles in their fleets—a
stipulation that, if applied to TNCs, would run counter to their
business model of requiring drivers to provide their own vehicles.179
Uber’s approach to accommodating passengers with disabilities, by
contrast, has been decidedly more piecemeal. The TNC has responded
to accusations of discrimination, in part, by increasing its output of
training and information materials to drivers—including recently
posting an “online video that drivers can choose to watch, which
shows how to best assist people with disabilities.”180 Uber has also
176
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piloted a number of programs over the years that it touts as outreach to
the disabled community—though few have caught on.181
UberACCESS, a program which “allow[ed] those who need an extra
hand or even a wheelchair accessible vehicle in Austin[, Texas] to
request a ride . . . 24 hours a day . . . at the same rates of UberX”
fizzled out entirely in less than a year for reasons that are unclear.182
To this day, only two programs remain intact.183 UberWAV—which
partners with paratransit drivers to provide wheelchair accessible
vehicles—claims to have “an average wait time of 7 minutes” in New
York City.184 But outside of New York City, the program remains
extremely limited in scope. The most successful initiative, by far, has
been UberASSIST, which is “designed to provide additional assistance
to seniors and people with disabilities.”185 UberASSIST allows
customers to specifically request drivers who have volunteered to be
“trained by [the] Open Doors Organization to assist riders into vehicles
and [a]ccommodate folding wheelchairs, walkers, and scooters.”186
The program has grown rapidly since its recent inception, but still has
not received widespread adoption outside of major metropolitan areas.
The program is also limited by the fact that it makes no provisions for
customers who need specialized accessible vehicles.187
Uber is careful to couch its training materials and disability-related
initiatives as “tips,” “suggestions,” or “voluntary” programs, so as not
to imply it is actually exerting control over its drivers.188 Yet because
181
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of this passive approach, the “law of mathematics” continues to ail the
company.189 Uber has all but admitted that, short of a more forceful
intervention, incidents of discrimination are bound to continue.190 And
as Harry Campbell, a TNC driver who authors a popular blog with tips
for Uber and Lyft drivers, points out: “Since Uber doesn’t provide
much training in the first place, many drivers are left to figure it out
and often feel like they’re thrown to the wolves, especially when first
starting. There are a lot of things that Uber asks drivers to do and when
there’s no central repository to get good information, this is what can
happen.”191
Both Uber and Lyft recognize that court-mandated ADA
compliance, alone, is not dispositive when it comes to California’s
“control” test for employment classification. In fact, many orthodox
cab drivers in California—all of whom are legally obliged to comply
with the ADA—are uncontroversially classified as independent
contractors. But because two federal courts have now ruled that the
“control” Uber and Lyft currently exert over their drivers is already
balanced in virtual equipoise between that of contractor and employee,
both TNCs are highly sensitive to anything that might tilt the scales.
Therein lays the dilemma. On the one hand, even though both
TNCs want their drivers to diligently follow anti-discrimination
policies, truly compelling ADA compliance—through more
interventionist measures such as mandatory disability training,
standardized procedures, or wheelchair accessible vehicle quotas—
would risk jeopardizing the drivers’ classification as independent
contractors. On the other hand, merely setting guidelines that their
drivers can, and allegedly do, disregard opens the companies up to a
host of other lawsuits. As Jim Weisman, CEO of the United Spinal
Association and one of the original framers of the ADA, said, “Uber’s
quite sensitive to the disability issue, but it’s way more sensitive to its
way of doing business and its bottom line. As soon as they give in, it’s
a chink in the armor.”192
From Uber’s standpoint, it is caught between the legal equivalent
of a rock and a hard place. A ruling in favor of ADA liability would
unquestionably provide fodder for those who claim Uber’s drivers
189
190
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should be reclassified as employees. Indeed, for all Uber knows, courtmandated ADA compliance requiring the company to exert additional
control over its drivers could prove to be the straw that broke the
jury’s back—resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars of additional
costs for the company.
As if those stakes alone were not high enough, Uber is far from the
only multibillion—much less multimillion—dollar company that
stands to be affected by the O’Connor verdict. Some commentators
believe that a ruling in favor of Uber’s drivers could be a harbinger of
more employment reclassification rulings to come for the on-demand
economy.193 One need only consider the swift reaction to the
California Labor Commission’s decision by companies such as Shyp
and Instacart for confirmation of the disquiet felt by many on-demand
businesses.
B. Forecasting ADA Liability for Transportation Network
Companies
Uber’s and Lyft’s strategy for navigating this dilemma of ADA
compliance thus far has been to pull a page from their employment
misclassification playbook. In answer to the lawsuits brought against
them, both TNCs have asserted a defense reminiscent of those featured
in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.194
They argue that “Title III [of the ADA] applies only to . . . place[s] of
public accommodation,” not “technology companies that provide
platforms for peer-to-peer sharing”; therefore, as a matter of law, the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim.195 The TNCs assert that, far from
being “public accommodations,” they are not even “transportation
compan[ies]” because “they do not provide specified public
transportation services and are not engaged in the business of
transporting people, but are simply mobile-based ridesharing platforms
to connect drivers and riders.”196 Lyft —just as it had in Cotter—
argues that “it does not own the vehicles drivers use or provide any
transportation.”197 Uber, likewise, contends that it “merely provide[s] a
193
194
195
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platform for people with particular skills or assets to connect with
other people looking to pay for those skills or assets.”198
The argument functions, essentially, as an affirmative defense. The
two TNCs need not deny that the discrimination occurred. Rather,
according to the theory they both advance, their ADA liability extends
only as far as the legal reaches of their software; and “since Plaintiffs
do not allege that they were unable to use the app, Defendants are not
discriminating against them.”199
Mystifyingly, though, both TNCs appear to have overlooked a
fundamental feature of the ADA that renders the first part of their
argument essentially irrelevant. Namely, that the statute covers more
than just public accommodations. It also applies to any “private entity
that is primarily engaged in the business of transporting people whose
operations affect commerce.”200 Indeed, it is precisely this provision
that subjects traditional taxi companies, which are not public
accommodations, to the ADA—even private taxi companies whose
drivers are classified as independent contractors.201 As the U.S.
Department of Justice noted in a brief it filed on behalf of the
petitioners in the NFBC case, “The success of Plaintiffs’ ADA claim is
not dependent on a finding that Defendants are a public
accommodation, because . . . Title III of the ADA applies to private
entities that are primarily engaged in providing transportation services
regardless of whether the private entity is a public accommodation.”202
In a February 2015 dismissal of Uber’s and Lyft’s “Motions to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint” in Ramos v. Uber Technologies, Inc.—
an ADA suit brought against Uber in Texas—a federal court affirmed
the Justice Department’s analysis, bluntly remarking that “Uber and
Lyft misread Title III.”203 The court continued, “Title III expressly
198
199
200
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applies to public accommodations and certain services operated by
private entities.” Put simply, “[the TNCs’] restrictive reading of Title
III as governing only public accommodations is contrary to its
structure and its plain language.”204 Accordingly, the court “reject[ed]
Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs must allege and prove that Uber
and Lyft operate places of public accommodation in order to state a
claim.”205
The ruling was not, in and of itself, fatal to the TNCs’ overall
defense. It simply changed the central legal question from whether
TNCs are public transportation companies to whether they are
transportation companies at all. With regard to this question, the court
proved less willing to offer an opinion. But, here, some of the
language from rulings in both O’Connor and Cotter may provide
insight.
In a 2015 denial of Uber’s Motion for Summary Judgment in
O’Connor, a San Francisco court stated that while “Uber passes itself
off as merely a technological intermediary between potential riders
and potential drivers . . . [t]his argument is fatally flawed in numerous
respects.”206 The court noted:
[Although] Uber now disclaims that it is a
“transportation company,” Uber has previously
referred to itself as an “On–Demand Car Service,” and
goes by the tagline “Everyone’s Private Driver.”
Indeed, in commenting on Uber’s planned expansion
into overseas markets, its CEO wrote on Uber’s official
blog: “We are ‘Everyone’s Private Driver.’ We are
Uber and we’re rolling out a transportation system in a
city near you.” Other Uber documents state that “Uber
provides the best transportation service in San
Francisco[.”] Moreover, Uber does not sell its
software in the manner of a typical distributor. Rather,
Uber is deeply involved in marketing its transportation
services, qualifying and selecting drivers, regulating
and monitoring their performance, disciplining (or
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terminating) those who fail to meet standards, and
setting prices.207
In a denial of Lyft’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Cotter, a
San Francisco court offered an almost identical analysis, stating:
Lyft tepidly asserts there is no need to decide how to
classify the drivers, because they don’t perform services
for Lyft in the first place. Under this theory, Lyft drivers
perform services only for their riders, while Lyft is an
uninterested bystander of sorts, merely furnishing a
platform that allows drivers and riders to connect,
analogous perhaps to a company like eBay. But that is
obviously wrong. Lyft concerns itself with far more than
simply connecting random users of its platform. It
markets itself to customers as an on-demand ride
service, and it actively seeks out those customers. It
gives drivers detailed instructions about how to conduct
themselves. Notably, Lyft’s own drivers’ guide and
FAQs state that drivers are “driving for Lyft.”
Therefore, the argument that Lyft is merely a
platform . . . is not a serious one.208
The sense among some experts following Uber’s ADA lawsuits
has been that until a long, hard-fought legal battle “settle[s] whether
Uber is a software company or transportation company, the disability
community will just have to be patient.”209 But what these two federal
court rulings suggest is that this question—which lies at the heart of
the ADA lawsuits—might have already been answered. Uber’s
liability under the ADA may no longer be a matter of “if,” but a matter
of “when.”
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V. CONCLUSION
Uber’s ADA dilemma stands as a synecdoche for an era
increasingly defined by the judicial system’s inability to keep pace
with rapid technological innovation. A few relatively low-profile cases
involving the ADA have inadvertently turned a seemingly trivial legal
assumption made years ago by an obscure startup into a question of
vast economic and moral significance. Hundreds of millions, if not
billions, of dollars now hang in the balance. So, too, do the rights of
some 57 million Americans with disabilities, for whom victory in
Uber’s ADA lawsuits could come to represent a major civil rights
milestone.210 Indeed, to borrow a provocative analogy from Christine
Griffin, executive director of the Disability Law Center: “If these
companies said ‘We’re not going to pick up women or AfricanAmericans,’ all the [customers] supporting them would be running
away. No one wants to look at this as a civil rights issue, when in fact
that’s what it is.”211
Though Griffin’s analogy pulls no punches, the importance of her
framing the issue as one involving civil rights cannot be overstated.
More than a quarter of a century after the passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, troubling disparities in access to transportation
for people with disabilities persist in the U.S. Of the roughly 57
million Americans with disabilities, over a third—twice as many as
those without disabilities—report having inadequate transportation
options.212 Unfortunately, these figures only increase with the severity
of the disability. People “with very severe disabilities are twice as
likely to think transportation is a major problem as . . . [those] with a
somewhat severe disability . . . and three times as likely as those with a
slight or moderate disability.”213
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For a new breed of companies whose staggering success has
increasingly led them to market themselves as a viable alternative to
car ownership, ADA liability presents a prospect for the disabled
community that was almost unimaginable just a decade ago: true
transportation equality. In the twenty-five years since the ADA’s
passage, this prospect has come to represent something of a holy grail
for disability rights activists, who have long sought in vain for a
solution to one of the federal statute’s most glaring shortcomings.
Namely, that the ADA is quite adept at ensuring that places are
accessible, but not so adept at ensuring that disabled people can
actually reach those places to begin with. After all, what good is a
wheelchair accessible building if there is no way for someone in a
wheelchair to get to it?
The potential of TNCs to bridge this heretofore unbridgeable gap is
not lost on those who have filed suit against Uber and Lyft under the
ADA. But whether this possibility becomes a reality will ultimately
depend on the continued profitability and viability of the TNC
business model as it is weathers the storm of legal challenges waiting
on the horizon.
Right now, all eyes in Silicon Valley are focused on O’Connor v.
Uber Technologies, Inc. But what the unique confluence of
circumstances presented in this piece suggests is that maybe, just
maybe, those eyes should instead be focused on a less conspicuous set
of cases that have the potential to shape not only the future of the ondemand economy, but also the future of the disabled community.

